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Creative accounting allows governments and, more particularly, finance ministers to somehow manage
financial reports to achieve specific and possibly self-interested goals. It is usually used to hide deficits. It
sometimes also helps to present financial performance as being more worrisome than it actually is. In that
case, ministers press more than needed for lower expenses and a higher tax burden. This pressure is
expected to tame deficits or increase surpluses over time. Using panel data relative to the 26 Swiss cantons
over the period 1980–2013, we estimate econometrically how a political finessing technique like ‘depreciations
management’ affects subsequent government expenses and revenues and thus subsequent financial
performance.
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What is the objective of accounting if not to provide
various stakeholders with the information needed to take
appropriate decisions? This is at least the theory sup-
porting the international public sector accounting stan-
dards when they press governments to report their
financial performance and position in a true and fair
view, i.e. in a way that reflects the economic substance
of transactions rather than just their legal form.1
A true and fair presentation of the situation is the stand-
ard against which all accounting practices have to be
assessed. Any practice that would depart from this stand-
ard belongs in the category of creative accounting. Cre-
ative accounting is ‘the transformation of financial
accounting figures from what they actually are to what
preparers desire by taking advantage of the existing rules
and/or ignoring some or all of them’ (Naser 1993, p. 2).
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the Creative Commons license, and indicate ifnecessarily a synonym of fraudulent action. Indeed, ‘man-
agers will be happy to use creative accounting as they will
be keeping to the letter, if not the spirit, of the law’ (p. 38).
Actually, there exists a grey area between accounts that
offer a fair presentation and those that are fraudulent.
Within this grey area, accounts are managed in compli-
ance with the rule of law. However, they do no longer
offer a fair presentation of the situation. When accounts
are managed, the apparent performance is modified
(Stolowy and Breton 2004, p. 7–11). Subsequently, it be-
comes more difficult for stakeholders, and especially the
legislature, to understand the government’s real fiscal per-
formance or position and to take efficient decisions.
Creative accounting is mostly associated with dam-
aging consequences. The recent crisis experienced by
member countries of the European Monetary Union
gives us evidence about the danger of such obfuscation.
When reporting a performance that is artificially im-
proved compared to the reality, cosmetic accounting re-
duces the need and the urgency of a structural fiscal
adjustment. It leads to a level of indebtedness that is trulyis distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made.
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been reported in a true and fair way.
On the contrary, forms of creative accounting that
underplay surpluses or even inflate deficits should have
beneficial effects on the governments’ subsequent financial
performance and indebtedness. For a government, report-
ing a surplus is politically risky. It would draw attention to
the fact that taxpayers paid excessive taxes compared to
the public services they received, or, to put it another way,
that they do not receive an equivalent amount of public
services with respect to the tax they pay. Lobbies or polit-
ical parties may then claim for a tax reduction or increases
in expenses.2 Such claims may in turn undermine the
long-term fiscal balance, especially when the surplus was
triggered by a favourable business cycle.
The political economy of deficits has investigated vari-
ous influencing factors on a government’s financial per-
formance. However, the specific impact of creative
accounting has not been paid much attention so far.
This is indeed the aim of this article: estimating the
likely impact of previous creative accounting operations
on the governments’ subsequent financial performance,
paying particular attention to surplus-managing political
finessing technique. The aim is also to identify through
which channels previous creative accounting possibly
impacts subsequent financial performance. Is it through
a change in subsequent expenses or through a change in
subsequent revenues? To the best of our knowledge, it
has never been attempted before.
A large body of evidence supports the idea that
European Union (EU) countries resorted to accounting
manipulations, notably during the run-up to European
Monetary Union (EMU). (Milesi-Ferretti and Moriyama
2006; Balassone et al. 2007). This literature also indicates
that governments were encouraged by fiscal rules to
manage their fiscal balances (Milesi-Ferretti 2004). Al-
though Switzerland is no member of the EMU, Luechin-
ger and Schaltegger (2013) did not rule out that deficits,
at the cantonal level, were reduced through political fi-
nessing when they demonstrated that fiscal rules signifi-
cantly reduced the frequency of deficits.
This paper contributes to this strand of literature, how-
ever from a different perspective. It expands Anthony’s ar-
gument (1985) that even if deficits are badly perceived,
surpluses are not considered much better by politicians
and citizens since a surplus highlights the notion that citi-
zens paid too much in taxes or obtained too few public
services. Therefore, a possible result of this situation is
that politicians and citizens claim tax cuts or government
expenses increases. The author suggests that states, local
governments, or municipalities may be tempted to use
conservative accounting practices to disguise surpluses or
to report only small surpluses. For instance, Pilcher (2011)
provides evidence that this kind of objective may beachieved using discretionary accruals. The author shows
that local governments of the state of New South Wales in
Australia rely on depreciation charges to do so. Stalebrink
(2007) also demonstrates that Swedish municipalities use
capital depreciations to manage reported financial per-
formance. In his view, Swedish municipalities would in-
crease capital depreciation during good economic periods
and would do the opposite to dampen deficits. Although
these studies found that creative accounting is also used
to manage surpluses, they do not measure the quantitative
impact of such practices on government financial per-
formance. Precisely, this paper aims at measuring this very
impact and broadens the spectrum of determinants that
are dealt with by the political economy of fiscal deficits.
Many contributions focus on political determinants and
notably on the political leaning of the government and
parliament as recently done by Tellier (2006). Moreover,
the political fragmentation of the government, measured
as the number of political parties represented in a cabinet
(Roubini and Sachs 1989) as well as the size of a cabinet,
namely the number of spending ministers in a cabinet
(Elgie and McMenamin 2008), has been investigated. At
the same time, some studies analyse the impact of the soli-
darity between the legislative and the executive powers
(Roubini and Sachs 1989). Furthermore, several studies
identify a political budget cycle (e.g. Shi and Svensson
2006; Veiga and Veiga 2007). More recently, a new strand
of literature, inspired by behavioural economics, is specif-
ically interested in the role of the finance ministers in
public sector financial management (Jochimsen and
Thomasius 2014; Chatagny 2015). Apart from the
political determinants, some studies investigate the
impact of institutional factors on government deficits
and indebtedness. In the Swiss context, they include
the impact of budget rules or fiscal constraints (Feld
and Kirchgässner 2008; Luechinger and Schaltegger
2013) as well as the effect of financial referendums
and popular initiatives (Feld and Matsusaka 2003).
This paper investigates, among the institutional factors,
how the budgeting and accounting technicalities can be
used, especially by finance ministers, to secure the govern-
ment’s financial performance. In this context, Chatagny
and Soguel (2012) show that tax revenue misestimation in
the beginning-of-the-year budget, due either to erroneous
projections as a result of incomplete information or to
strategic motives, significantly lowers the end-of-the-year
deficits of the Swiss cantons. However, no paper has so far
assessed how political finessing, and notably book entries
that manipulate the amount of depreciation charges, af-
fects future deficits (or surpluses).
To tackle this objective, this paper recourses to the
methodology previously adopted by Krishnakumar et al.
(2010)). In particular, it models simultaneously revenue
and expenditure to take into consideration the structural
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revenue and expenses, since the fundamental principle
of fiscal balance is rooted in the Constitution or the
FMA of all Swiss cantons.7 Furthermore, it extends the
time-span by a third compared to the previous empirical
works dedicated to the Swiss cantons.
The 26 Swiss cantons provide a valuable setting for this
empirical research. In Swiss cantons, several referenda
have demonstrated the median voter’s preferences for bal-
anced budgets and her aversion to deficits.3 The individual
cantonal legislation, and in particular each cantonal Fi-
nance Management Act of Parliament (FMA4), reflects
these preferences. Of course, the FMA differs from canton
to canton as Swiss cantons maintain a high degree of au-
tonomy in this area. However, almost all 26 FMA share a
common conservative fiscal stance. This attitude finds
concrete expression in the way expenses and revenues are
reported. Most FMAs set out or tolerate certain political
finessing. They especially allow the preparers to manage
depreciation charges to inflate expenses and thus under-
play surpluses where necessary or desirable; even though
in doing so, the reported performance no longer reflects
the canton’s exact balance, i.e. the balance that would re-
flect the sole economic substance of transactions. Al-
though perfectly lawful, these kinds of entries clearly fall
into the grey area mentioned by Stolowy and Breton
(2004). The intercantonal conference of cantonal finance
ministers explicitly admits that depreciations management is
a tool for fiscal politics and involves the downside of creat-
ing hidden reserves in a way that lacks transparency (CFM
2008). According to the abovementioned and universally
recognised definition given to creative accounting, deprecia-
tions management—just as earnings management—must be
considered a form of a creative accounting since the account
no longer offers a fair presentation of the situation. When
earnings management manipulates the profit or the deficit
of an organisation with book entries related to revenues
(Healy and Wahlen 1999, p. 368), depreciations manage-
ment uses book entries related to expenses.
The cantonal setting is also valuable since a common
and detailed chart of account allows those with the neces-
sary accounting skills and understanding to detect the
book entries related to depreciations management. The
main book entry that allows finance ministers to inflate
expenses is the so-called additional depreciation charges
(AD). With some insight and expert knowledge, the
amount of AD that is charged to an accounting period
can be spotted in the detailed annual general purpose fi-
nancial report5 of the period, since a specific budget head-
ing in the chart of accounts is used for AD.
Obviously, State auditors—just to mention them—are
fully aware of the fact that these entries undermine the
true and fair presentation of performance. However, the
FMA passed by the Parliament sets the terms ofreference for the auditor.6 It explicitly requires this latter
to certify whether reports are law-abiding. Most notice-
ably, it does not require her to certify whether reports
offer a true presentation. That paradox—knowing that
the reported results might not present the truth but are
nevertheless law-abiding—is an exclusivity that is worth
exploiting and is exploited in this article.
Using panel data including information related to the 26
Swiss cantons for the period 1980–2013, we estimate two
different models in order to measure the likely impact of
depreciations management on the government’s financial
performance. AD is our main explanatory variable, and it
is constructed on the basis of the amount of ‘additional
depreciation charges’ that were recorded at the end of
each of these years and that we identified in each canton’s
financial reports. The first model is a single-equation
model where the financial performance (deficit or surplus)
is the dependent variable. Then, we perform a
simultaneous-equation model where the level of revenues
and the level of expenses are simultaneously estimated.
The advantage of the second approach is that it disentan-
gles the respective possible effect of depreciations man-
agement on revenues and expenses. The results show that
a positive and significant correlation exists between previ-
ous additional ‘depreciation’ charges and the subsequent
level of revenues, whereas a negative correlation exists
with the level of subsequent expenses, with a similar order
of magnitude. Consequently, depreciations management
seems to produce a significant positive impact on the
future balance.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In
the 'Methods' section, we present the framework of our
analysis from an accounting perspective, the quantitative
importance of depreciations management in the Swiss
cantons and both models to be econometrically tested.
Results are reported and commented on in ‘Results and
discussion’ section, followed by our final conclusion.
Methods
Statement of financial performance: key component of a
government’s financial statements
When a government implements accrual accounting, in-
stead of cash-based accounting, the statement of financial
performance is the most scrutinised component of the fi-
nancial statements.8 By comparing the operating revenues
(R) with the operating expenses (E), its balance (B = R − E)
shows whether citizens pay taxes that are equal to the
public services they receive. The surplus (B > 0) or the def-
icit (B < 0) sparks the political discussion and captures
both media and public attention. This is especially the
case where a legal rule caps the deficit or even bans that
possibility. In most Swiss cantons, the legislation govern-
ing public finance contains such a provision although at
varying extents and magnitudes.
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ment of financial position (i.e. a balance sheet). This compo-
nent attracts considerably less interest compared to what
prevails in the private sector. However, among the assets
and liabilities it presents, the stock of a government’s debt
has lately become the noticeable exception. Eventually, the
cash flow statement links both components by considering
also the flow of cash from investing activities.
Cash flow from operating activities and the change in
debt level
Operating revenues (R) correspond by and large to inflows
of cash resulting from operating activities. In terms of op-
erating expenses (E), the correspondence with outflows of
cash is weaker since not all expenses are disbursements.
Typically, only part of the operating expenses (E*)—like
wages, purchase of goods and services, and interest pay-
ments—drains cash. Other operating expenses such as de-
preciation charges (D) trigger no payment, meaning that
they have no impact on cash.9 These book entries are
purely accounting charges. In a true and fair view, the
amount of the depreciation charge must accurately match
the wear and tear and obsolescence of assets.
Therefore, B = R − (E* +D), since E = E* +D.
The cash flow from operating activities is equivalent to
R − E* or B +D. It indicates how much cash remains after
operating revenues are used to pay for cash-draining oper-
ating expenses. It also indicates how much cash is avail-
able to pay for capital expenditures and to pay down the
government’s debt. For any given level of capital expend-
iture and depreciation, a reduction of B limits the amount
of debt the government can pay down.
Depreciations management to disguise performance and
to maximise cash flow from operating activities
Accrual accounting increases the degree of technicality
compared to cash-based accounting. As noted by Zim-
merman (1977) or Giroux (1989), those who do not have
expertise of accounting face many difficulties in dissecting
the information provided by financial reports. The finance
minister may rely on this asymmetry of expertise between
himself on one side, the other members of the govern-
ment (i.e. the spending ministers), and the members of
parliament on the other side. The finance minister is all
the more likely to do so when he has a legal obligation to
balance the statement of financial performance or if he
politically commits to lowering the debt.
A finance minister who would report a surplus may face
requests for either enhanced services (i.e. an increase of E)
or tax cuts in the near future (i.e. a reduction of R), or both.
If those claims were effectively implemented, it would lower
the balance over time and possibly lead to a deficit. In turn,
this would lower subsequent cash flows from operating ac-
tivities and the possibility of paying down debt.In most cantons, the Financial Management Act of Parlia-
ment (FMA) offers the finance minister a strong conserva-
tive bias. The most common solution is the possibility—but
not the obligation—to discretionarily inflate operating ex-
penses by managing depreciations with ‘depreciation’ charges
(AD).10 AD must not be confused with the ‘true’ depreci-
ation charges (D) representing the very actual wear and tear
and obsolescence of assets. The true depreciation charges
are calculated using either the declining-balance method
(constant depreciation rate applied on the residual book
value) or the straight-line (constant rate applied to the acqui-
sition cost of the asset). The rate is determined according to
the useful working life of the considered asset. For each cap-
ital expenditure, the Parliament decides over the amount of
the expenditure it authorises, the duration of the working life
of the assets, and the depreciation charges that follows.
Thus, there is no possibility for the executive branch of the
government or for the finance minister to compromise on
the amount of D that has to be recognised every year.11
By contrast, AD are depreciations just in name; they do
not reflect any economic reality, any wear, tear or obsoles-
cence of any asset. They are a pure accounting entry. They
are named as such in the FMA, but they could also have
been named ‘inflating expenses’ because it is their role: AD
just inflate expenses without any corresponding outflow of
cash (i.e. without any increase in E*). Following Stolowy and
Breton (2004), they must be considered a form of creative
accounting in spite of their legality, since the reported bal-
ance no longer truly presents the reality. For any given level
of operating revenues, cash-draining operating expenses
and true depreciation, AD deteriorate the reported
balance of the statement of financial performance: BR
= R − (E* +D + AD) where BR refers to the reported
balance of the statement of financial performance, i.e.
the one published in accounts and marred by AD.
When AD > 0, BR < B, B being the true balance.
The level of the cash flow from operating activities corre-
sponds now to BR +AD+D. However, its amount remains
unchanged since BR +AD=B. In this way, AD allows the fi-
nance minister to conceal, in whole or in part, a potential
surplus without any change in the capacity to pay down
debt or to invest.
Quantitative importance of depreciations management in
the Swiss cantons
Table 1 presents summary statistics pertaining to the use
of additional depreciation charges in the Swiss cantons
over the period of 1980–2012. It also presents the re-
ported balance (BR) and the true balance (B), i.e. the re-
ported balance corrected from the AD (B = BR + AD).
Data on additional depreciation charges (AD) and the re-
ported balance (BR) were compiled directly by the authors
from each of the annual financial reports of each of the 26
cantons. AD were identified using the specific budget
Table 1 Additional 'depreciation' charges, reported and true balance in real Swiss francs per capita—summary statistics per canton
(1980–2012)
Canton N Additional 'depreciation' charges (AD) Reported balance (BR) True balance (B = BR + AD)
F Mean Std. dev. Min Max Mean Std. dev. Min Max Mean Std. dev. Min Max
AG 19 9 4 9 0 27 83 178 − 147 439 81 805 − 3035 902
AI 34 28 168 159 0 780 50 60 − 37 192 239 194 − 79 800
AR 34 11 43 201 0 1173 1 526 − 1180 2546 51 233 − 458 827
BE 27 22 129 187 0 550 − 154 415 − 1054 300 − 117 499 − 2196 324
BL 33 27 95 198 0 941 60 231 − 263 693 191 302 − 257 822
BS 19 0 0 0 0 0 683 665 − 494 2083 384 1150 − 3151 1788
FR 18 1 14 59 0 250 251 813 − 131 3469 170 243 − 215 634
GE 28 1 63 333 0 1764 − 309 955 − 1726 1829 − 262 948 − 1719 1868
GL 34 12 74 151 0 648 41 372 − 551 1919 169 530 − 821 1912
GR 26 14 178 471 0 2438 196 559 − 794 1951 358 603 − 418 2201
JU 34 6 21 57 0 263 21 581 − 805 3144 − 147 273 − 899 246
LU 26 18 46 61 0 210 172 540 − 315 2603 126 269 − 378 686
NE 34 0 0 0 0 0 − 201 272 − 1342 90 42 241 − 655 416
NW 34 24 260 371 0 1559 49 136 − 231 510 256 355 − 239 1179
OW 28 17 154 197 0 717 161 713 − 224 3758 232 248 − 216 887
SG 17 0 0 0 0 0 127 207 − 273 659 44 300 − 504 636
SH 24 12 72 137 0 573 69 327 − 382 1343 132 270 − 411 767
SO 32 15 72 163 0 819 − 139 671 − 1910 2356 − 143 479 − 1019 793
SZ 27 27 143 102 17 373 123 460 − 929 1001 211 421 − 571 1105
TG 32 20 35 103 0 563 58 174 − 229 368 71 197 − 262 428
TI 34 5 64 207 0 901 11 442 − 965 914 20 478 − 988 1037
UR 30 18 552 635 0 2819 166 318 − 285 1131 627 631 − 304 1728
VD 34 12 42 97 0 472 − 127 399 − 796 535 − 60 458 − 871 705
VS 31 9 86 145 0 408 134 835 − 472 4504 167 356 − 416 842
ZG 34 31 286 193 0 766 463 471 − 174 1652 613 605 − 126 2370
ZH 32 5 2 6 0 16 12 390 − 1227 1079 − 10 369 − 1177 631
Overall 755 344 113 252 0 2819 61 520 − 1909 4504 129 514 − 3151 2370
Column N indicates the number of years during which each canton applied the common chart of accounts. Column F reports the absolute frequency of additional
depreciation charges, i.e. the number of years at the end of which AD were recorded (thus N > F). The central panel shows the balance as it was reported by the
cantons BR, i.e. the balance marred by additional depreciation charges. The right panel shows the corrected true balance B, i.e. the balance that would have been
reported if AD had not been booked. Corrections were also made to suppress operations on cookie-jar reserves and exceptional operating revenues and operating
expenses. Cantons are ranked according in alphabetical order
Source: Swiss cantons’ financial statements; compilation by the authors
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chart of accounts used by the Swiss cantons (heading 332
until year 2008 and 383 since then).12 Figures are
expressed in real terms per capita.13 Given that Swiss can-
tons vary considerably in population and financial sizes,
working with per capita figures allows us to control for
this heterogeneity.
Additionally, the column N indicates the number of years
for which each canton applied the common chart of ac-
count and the column F reports the absolute frequency of
additional depreciation charges (N ≥ F). For instance, the
canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden (AI) was among the first
to implement the common chart of account and has beenusing it for 34 years. Over that period, it has recorded add-
itional depreciation charges in 28 of its 34 annual financial
reports. The canton of St. Gallen (SG) was a late-adopter.
However, it never recorded any AD in the 17 annual re-
ports it has presented under the common chart of account.
The cantons are ranked in descending order based on the
average true balance over the considered period.
Twenty-three cantons out of 26 record AD at some point
over the period. However, a strong heterogeneity exists
among these cantons. The canton that registered the highest
amount on average is the canton of Uri (UR) since it entered
552 Swiss francs (CHF) per capita on average compared to
the canton of Zurich (ZH) which entered an average 2 CHF
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the second canton—the canton of Zug (ZG)—only entered
286 CHF per capita on average. Standard deviations together
with minima and maxima and the absolute frequency also
indicate a strong intertemporal variability.
The heterogeneity is also strong in terms of reported
and true balances of the statement of financial perform-
ance. Nonetheless, the standard deviation appears to be
smaller for reported balances in many cantons, suggesting
that AD is effectively used to smooth reported balances.
On average additional depreciation charges lower the sur-
plus from + 129 CHF per capita down to a reported
amount of + 61 CHF per capita. This points out the fact
that Swiss cantons generally experienced a structural sur-
plus which was partially managed thanks to the use of
AD. This is at least true for cantons presenting a positive
true balance (B > 0) on average between 1980 and 2013.
The picture is however quite different when paying
attention to cantons presenting a negative corrected (or
true) balance (B < 0) over the considered period. For those
cantons (Bern-BE, Geneva-GE and Vaud-VD; with the ex-
ception of Solothurn-SO), inflating expenses with AD
leads to an even larger deficit on average.
Models and variables
In order to estimate the impact of previous creative
accounting operations on the government’s financial
performance, two approaches are used following Krishna-
kumar et al. (2010). A single-equation model directly esti-
mates the impact of additional depreciations booked in
the past on deficits and surpluses. Alternatively, a system
of two equations, one for true revenues and one for true
expenses, models the impact of previous creative account-
ing operations on the actual financial performance. Be-
cause of the conservative stance of the cantonal fiscal
policy, models are estimated with regard to different pos-
sible outcomes. Model I considers all observation irre-
spective of the sign of the (subsequent) balance. Model II
considers only the case where the (subsequent) true bal-
ance is positive (surplus). Model III is when the (subse-
quent) true balance is negative (deficit). Previous AD are
especially expected to enhance (subsequent) surpluses.
Single-equation model
The linear regression model explaining directly the im-
pact of AD on the balance is expressed as follows:
Bi;t ¼ αþ δADi;t−1 þ βXi;t þ θi þ τt þ εi;t
where the dependent variable B is the cantonal corrected
(true) BALANCE as previously defined: B > 0 in a case of
surpluses and B < 0 in a case of deficits. Our explanatory
variable is AD(− 1), namely the first lag of the additional
depreciation charges and δ is its associated coefficient.The first lag reflects the fact that (previous) creative ac-
counting operations booked in the year t − 1 financial re-
ports are expected to almost immediately influence the
(subsequent) governments’ fiscal performance. Indeed,
the government makes the year t − 1 fiscal result publicly
available by the very beginning of year t. Therefore,
AD(− 1) immediately limit administration units’ requests
for additional budget appropriation even during fiscal
year t and even though initial budget appropriations are
insufficient. They also immediately exclude wishes for
tax cuts starting in year t already.14
Then, X is the vector of control variables and β is
the corresponding vector of coefficients. Furthermore,
θ refers to cantonal fixed effects and τ to time fixed
effects. The error term is represented by ε. Lastly, i
and t denote the individual Swiss canton and year.
First, we control for the GDP GROWTH rate: because of
automatic stabilisers, it is expected to positively influ-
ence the revenues and negatively influence the expenses.
Furthermore, we can reasonably expect that the
UNEMPLOYMENT rate (as a percentage of active popula-
tion) deteriorates the governments’ financial perform-
ance by simultaneously increasing operating expenses
and decreasing operating revenues. The composition of
the population may also influence the governments’ fi-
nancial performance. Notably, it is sometimes assumed
(Feld and Matsusaka 2003) that a larger share of elderly
in a canton’s population (older than 65 years) should
generate higher healthcare and social expenses (ELDERLY).
But, on the other hand, this category of citizens may ex-
press a more conservative view on public finance. The
governments’ political leaning also deserves a particular
attention (LEANING). Notably, right-wing governments
have been shown to spend less than those that lean to
the left (Tellier 2006). This variable reflects the average
political leanings of cantonal governments.15 According to
Roubini and Sachs (1989), fragmented governments are
associated with higher public deficits. For that reason, the
variable FRAGMENTATION captures the number of political
parties represented in a government. The alignment be-
tween the executive and the legislative powers is also
taken into account through the variable CONCORDANCE,
which is the share of seats in the parliament held by the
parties represented in the government. According to Rou-
bini and Sachs (1989), a misalignment between both pow-
ers should reduce the likelihood they reach agreements,
which in turn is expected to result in excessive operating
expenses. Furthermore, Valesco (2000) considers a govern-
ment’s budget as a common good pulled by various interest
groups. Thus, a large amount of spending DEPARTMENTS (i.e.
spending ministries, by contrast with the finance ministry)
within a cantonal administration should lead to higher
operating expenses. DEPARTMENTS should therefore be
negatively associated with the level of public balances.
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Svensson (2006), the electoral cycle prompts an increase in
government expenses and a reduction of revenues during
ELECTION years in an attempt by incumbent politicians to
raise their chances of being re-elected. ELECTION is a
dummy variable taking the value of 1 during election years
and 0 otherwise. Governments also have to cope with insti-
tutional constraints. Among these constraints, popular
INITIATIVES and REFERENDUMS, including a financial referen-
dum, are typical institutions of Switzerland’s direct demo-
cratic system at the cantonal level. According to Feld and
Kirchgässner 2000, financial referendums increase citizen
scrutiny and prompt governments to keep expenses under
the limit above which a project is sent to ballot box. The
limit being more or less restrictive depending on the can-
ton, the dampening effect varies. As for popular initiatives,
they allow citizens to suggest changes in legislation. Sugges-
tions may lead either to an increase or to a decrease of gov-
ernment expenses. The ease with which both tools can be
used is measured with the index put forward by Stutzer and
Frey (2000). Finally, previous works (Feld and Kirchgässner
2008; Luechinger and Schaltegger 2013) indicate that fiscal
RULES force governments to lower deficits and to show a
positive structural balance over time. The variable reflecting
the stringency of fiscal rules is the one proposed by Luechin-
ger and Schaltegger (2013), where the value is 3 in case the
rule of the canton is among the most stringent, 2 where the
rule is fairly stringent, 1 for the least stringent, and 0 other-
wise (no rule). We also control for the MISESTIMATION of tax
revenue, which refers to the difference between the fore-
casted amount of tax revenue and the reported tax revenue.
As shown by Chatagny and Soguel (2012), finance ministers
in the Swiss cantons generally strategically underestimate tax
revenue during the budgeting process, possibly to put public
expenses under pressure. Underestimating tax revenue (MIS-
ESTIMATION < 0) should therefore decrease deficits (therefore
β < 0). With BALANCE (−1), we eventually control for the fact
that B is not independent from its previous level. It may suf-
fer from temporal inertia in particular because governments
frequently resort to incremental budgeting.16
In order to ensure the significance and the consistency
of our results, some elements must be considered. First,
Swiss cantons are quite heterogeneous and this variability
affects also the size of their various budgets. Expressing
the variables per capita does not fully prevent the error
terms to suffer from heteroskedasticity, as shown by the
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test.17 Secondly, despite
the inclusion of a lag on the dependent variable in the
model, the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation reveals the
presence of a first-order serial correlation. Nevertheless,
the Arellano-Bond test does not confirm the presence of a
second-order autocorrelation. Thirdly, as all cantons be-
long to the same country, error terms are possibly con-
temporaneously correlated. Fourthly, fixed effects allowthe model to capture differences that can be hardly mea-
sured or observed. The Breusch and Pagan test as well as
the Hausman test validate this strategy. Furthermore, the
inclusion of cantonal fixed effects is more relevant than
random effects when considering the whole population,
i.e. the 26 Swiss cantons. However, the inclusion of can-
tonal fixed effects increases the risk of multicollinearity.
Fifthly, our panel is unbalanced as not every Swiss canton
introduced the recommended accounting model simultan-
eously. Nevertheless, it does not cause any econometric
concern since the time of introduction varied randomly
among them. Therefore, the reason why data are missing
for some cantons is exogenous. Finally, the time series is
longer than the cross section: T = 33 years (1980–2012)
compared to N = 26 cantons.
We report here only the results obtained with the Panel
Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) estimator. This estima-
tor has the advantage of correcting heteroskedasticity and
contemporaneous correlation. It also deals with first-order
autocorrelation. Furthermore, the panel needs not to be
balanced, and the estimator efficiently works when the
cross section is smaller than the time series. Cantonal and
time fixed effects are also included with the PCSE estima-
tor in order to take into account regional and historical
specificities not captured by control variables.18 Given the
characteristics of the dataset, alternative estimators were
utilised to make sure that the results are robust: an OLS
estimator including cantonal fixed effects, where error
terms are corrected with the White procedure; an estima-
tor proposed by Baltagi and Wu (1999) which fits a cross-
sectional time series regression model when the error
terms are first order correlated (REGAR); a two-stage least
square (2SLS) estimator where heteroskedasticity and ser-
ial correlation are taken into account by applying the
White correction; and the system-GMM procedure which
allows standard errors to be robust to heteroskedasticity
and patterns of autocorrelation within individuals.
Some regressors may be potentially endogenous. There-
fore, some valid instruments must be used to avoid biased
and inconsistent estimated parameters.19 The tax revenue
misestimation may be endogenous. Indeed, since the error is
computed as the difference between forecasted and actual
tax revenue, some simultaneity may appear between the var-
iables’ BALANCE and MISESTIMATION (Chatagny and Soguel
2012). The first difference of the tax revenue misestimation
is used as an instrument. Also, the fiscal institutions them-
selves may also be endogenous since their stringency could
be modified depending on the cantonal financial perform-
ance. Following previous works (Feld and Matsusaka 2003;
Martin 2008), we consider the financial REFERENDUM, the
popular INITIATIVES, and the fiscal RULES as potentially
endogenous. Since our data do not exhibit second-order
autocorrelation, we use the second lagged value of these
variables as instruments.
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Obviously, the true deficit or the surplus in the statement
of financial performance is the difference between the true
operating revenues R and the true operating expenses E.
Therefore, using a simultaneous-equation model allows us
to distinguish through which channel—revenues and/or
expenses—additional depreciation charges eventually affect
the (subsequent) financial performance. Following the sem-
inal idea of Lowry and Alt (1994), Krishnakumar et al.
(2010) presented a first attempt to simultaneously model
revenue and expenditure. Chapman and Gorina (2012)
elaborate the concept further. On the basis of the public
choice literature and on a general model of government
budget (which is not reproduced here), they state that ‘any
estimation of expenditure and revenue equations must in-
volve the use of the simultaneous equation framework’ (p.
23). Benito et al. (2013) also use the assumption of simul-
taneity. Essentially, while the level of operating revenues
originating from various sources—including taxation and
fiscal equalisation—will mostly determine the level of oper-
ating expenses, the latter should also influence the operat-
ing revenues to be collected by the government in order to
achieve a particular level of public service provision. As a
consequence, operating revenues and operating expenses
are explanatory endogenous variables. Thus, the model
comprising two equations can be written as follows:
Ri;t ¼ αR þ δRADi;t−1 þ γREi;t þ βRWi;t þ θRi þ τRt
þ εRi;t
Ei;t ¼ αE þ δEADi;t−1 þ γERi;t þ βRZi;t þ θEi þ τEt
þ εEi;t
where the αR and αE represent the intercepts, γR measures
the marginal effect of expenses on revenues and γE the
marginal effect of revenues on expenses.20 W and Z are
the sets of control variables explaining operating revenues
and operating expenses, and βR and βE are their associated
coefficients. Although they include the same set of control
variables, W and Z are still different as they each include
the lagged of the dependent variable of their respective
equations. To test whether R and E are Granger-caused,
W also include the lagged value of E and Z also include
the lagged value of R. Then, θ and τ are two-way fixed ef-
fects, and εR and εE are the error terms. δR and δE are the
coefficients associated to our variable of interest, AD.
The different features of the model must be consid-
ered to produce consistent estimates. As for the single-
equation framework, heteroscedasticity is treated using
White correction for standard errors. What is more,
some regressors in W and Z are correlated with ε, i.e.
endogenous. Additionally, because R and E are simultan-
eously determined, they are endogenous too. Hence,
such endogeneity requires the use of an estimator of theIV class. With the system of simultaneous equations,
E εRi;tε
E
i;t
h i
¼ 0 does not hold and allows the efficiency
to be increased by using an estimator that also takes
into account the correlation between error terms. As
the set of instruments is the same across both equa-
tions, we use the three-stage least square (3SLS)
estimator.
Results and discussion
Single-equation model
Table 2 reports results from the single-equation model
explaining the financial performance of the overall sample
(model I). It also reports results for both subsamples: when
the balance turns out to be a surplus in the near future
(model II) or a deficit (model III). AD(−1) shows the ex-
pected positive relationship: inflating charges with 1 add-
itional CHF AD per capita in the past helps to improve the
fiscal performance by 0.259 CHF (model I) and especially
to generate and increase a surplus by 0.190 CHF (model II).
As for reducing the near future deficit (model III), the coef-
ficient, although positive, is not significant. More generally,
according to the R-squared, the specification is less effective
in explaining deficits than in explaining surpluses.
A potential reverse causal effect of BALANCE on AD
might exist if we postulate that expectations about
future budgets have an impact on AD. For example, the
finance minister could use creative accounting more ex-
tensively if he expects larger deficits in the future. We
cannot entirely rule out this risk, notably because it
proves impossible to produce convincing instruments.
Thus, causality cannot be indubitably claimed.
Regarding significant control variables, the models con-
firm some of the findings of the existing literature, while
shedding additional light by segmenting into cases of sur-
plus and deficits. Surplus tends to be lower when the
share of ELDERLY is larger in the population (model II).
BALANCE tends to be improved and the DEFICIT to be
smaller when governments lean more to the right (LEAN-
ING) (especially model III). Surplus tends to be larger when
it is easier to use the right to petition (INITIATIVE, model
II), whereas deficit tends to be inferior when it is easier to
have recourse to the right of REFERENDUM (model III). The
tax revenue MISESTIMATION also strongly increase surpluses
(model II), typically in case of underestimation (MISESTIMA-
TION < 0), without having a significant impact on deficits.
The models also confirm that a path dependency exists, but
that is especially the case for surpluses: the larger the previ-
ous surplus, BALANCE (−1), the larger the (subsequent) sur-
plus (model II). Noticeably, such path dependency does not
emerge in case of previous deficits (model III). Although
some of the control variables are individually not signifi-
cant, joint tests of significance show that the coefficients
are jointly significant.21
Table 2 Results for the single-equation model
Overall sample Subsamples
Model I Model II Model III
Surpluses only
(B > 0)
Deficits only
(B < 0)
AD(− 1) 0.259*** 0.190*** 0.169
(0.076) (0.067) (0.140)
Growth 12.835 4.075 11.615
(8.715) (6.890) (12.364)
Unemployment − 40.515 − 36.414 − 18.726
(27.800) (25.272) (31.027)
Elderly − 41.152* − 43.221*** 6.601
(24.233) (14.872) (25.877)
Leaning − 176.717*** − 77.532* − 147.956**
(56.748) (40.538) (63.851)
Fragmentation − 15.799 − 29.366 17.861
(42.744) (29.361) (47.090)
Concordance − 62.071 − 144.951 211.956
(173.191) (140.321) (258.737)
Departments − 3.934 − 3.181 10.987
(11.357) (9.977) (13.955)
Election 3.995 39.070 − 42.618
(37.079) (26.965) (41.752)
Initiative 103.349 175.484*** − 25.178
(84.209) (61.002) (118.961)
Referendum − 42.176 − 56.754 68.208**
(35.967) (34.767) (34.664)
Rules − 5.540 − 19.214 − 24.714
(47.459) (25.928) (58.857)
Misestimation − 0.439*** − 0.426*** 0.270
(0.129) (0.069) (0.173)
Balance(− 1) 0.262*** 0.220*** − 0.003
(0.084) (0.033) (0.075)
Constant 1511.481*** 999.567** − 388.93
(576.440) (429.977) (744.623)
Cantonal FE YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES
R-Squared 0.488 0.596 0.513
Joint, p value 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 729 475 254
(1) Dependent variable: cantonal corrected (‘true’) balance in real terms per
capita at time t; (2) cantonal fixed and time fixed effects are considered; and
(3) parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation
within. Asterisks denote the level of significance of parameter values:
*** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level
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Table 3 below reports results from the simultaneous-
equation model explaining the financial performance as the
balance between revenues and expenses. Inflating previous
expenses with AD significantly correlates both with (subse-
quent) operating revenues and with operating expenses. As
expected (subsequent) revenues are positively correlated and
expenses negatively. The correlations are mostly significant
with the overall sample (model I) and in case of surplus
(model II). However, the relationship appears less significant
in the case of operating expenses when considering the sub-
sample pooling the deficit situations only (model III).
In view of this, the improvement in subsequent financial
performance stemming from (previous) additional depre-
ciation charges seems to come through both channels: a
support for (subsequent) tax revenue and a pressure on
(subsequent) operating expenses. The effect is almost equal,
with 1 additional CHF AD per capita corresponding with
subsequent revenues to be 0.207 CHF higher and subse-
quent expenses to be 0.262 CHF lower (model I). Thus, the
combined effect improves subsequent financial performance
by about 0.469 CHF per capita. This impact is slightly larger
than the one estimated from the single-equation model.
However, this measure is more precise since the
simultaneous-equation model partials out more precisely the
effects of the control variables on expenses and revenues.
As for the control variables, the previous findings are
broadly confirmed, especially with ELDERLY, LEANING,
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM and MISESTIMATION that correlate
either with operating revenues or operating expenditure
and therefore ultimately with the financial performance.
With a level significance of 10%, RULES correlates—as
expected—negatively with operating expenses.22 The
already mentioned path dependency appears present on
both sides of the budget. Consistent with the existing lit-
erature on incremental budgeting, (subsequent) revenues
and expenses depend partially—but not fully—from their
(previous) level (− 1). Table 3 also shows that coefficients
on EXPENSES (− 3) are statistically significant in the
REVENUES equations (in all three models) and that
REVENUES (− 3) is statistically significant in the EXPENSE equa-
tion (at least in model I). Thus, it seems that REVENUES are
Granger-caused by EXPENSES and vice-versa.23
Robustness checks
On top of estimating the single-equation model using alter-
native estimators, several robustness checks were performed
to ensure the reliability in the results. A necessary precaution
followed the splitting of the overall sample into two subsam-
ples. The subsample pooling the surplus situations only is
censored (B > 0) and so is the subsample pooling deficit situ-
ations only (B < 0). Such truncation at zero may lead to in-
consistent linear regressions estimates. Thus, we estimated
model II and model III using the Tobit estimator. We also
Table 3 Results for the simultaneous-equations model
Overall sample (I) Surpluses only (II) Deficits only (III)
Revenues Expenses Revenues Expenses Revenues Expenses
AD(− 1) 0.207*** − 0.262*** 0.221*** − 0.271*** 0.268** − 0.265*
(0.056) (0.058) (0.051) (0.045) (0.107) (0.153)
Growth 3.659 − 5.556 − 0.192 − 3.688 15.911* − 14.975
(6.436) (6.841) (6.41) (5.979) (9.156) (13.194)
Unemployment − 56.984*** 22.964 − 35.629 23.669 21.437 − 31.884
(20.237) (22.095) (25.671) (23.867) (28.695) (41.494)
Elderly − 22.386 31.019* − 20.099 41.534*** − 26.254 − 10.134
(16.387) (17.109) (16.591) (14.863) (29.267) (44.115)
Leaning − 148.549*** 120.13*** − 68.121 91.283** − 115.571** 71.400
(36.736) (40.465) (44.633) (41.462) (48.061) (73.771)
Fragmentation − 46.035 38.552 − 59.238* 33.214 5.141 3.870
(28.547) (30.422) (29.314) (27.369) (41.780) (59.581)
Concordance − 24.939 − 38.935 − 161.682 108.808 − 143.424 5.217
(131.669) (140.563) (135.00) (125.368) (197.674) (286.535)
Departments 12.598 14.331 9.366 6.341 12.147 − 3.524
(10.512) (11.133) (12.031) (11.235) (11.761) (17.287)
Election 7.102 − 2.610 32.450 − 30.577 − 40.910 27.665
(26.226) (28.006) (27.535) (25.594) (31.615) (45.538)
Initiative 110.642 − 101.956 209.760* − 230.671** − 514.333** 696.310**
(111.601) (120.518) (105.122) (98.630) (201.913) (281.781)
Referendum 24.247 79.232 − 23.316 94.424** 282.286*** − 270.813**
(51.705) (55.696) (51.032) (47.515) (82.116) (116.093)
Rules − 32.723 23.074 − 38.696 45.861 50.581 − 158.574*
(40.642) (43.582) (48.987) (45.083) (56.873) (82.777)
Misestimation − 0.491*** − 0.262*** − 0.164*
(0.118) (0.101) (0.084)
Revenues 0.396*** 0.681*** 0.810***
(0.064) (0.054) (0.103)
Expenses 0.584*** 0.829*** 0.878***
(0.049) (0.040) (0.036)
Revenues(− 1) 0.315*** 0.145*** 0.063**
(0.032) (0.027) (0.030)
Expenses (− 1) 0.396*** 0.202*** 0.156***
(0.473) (0.038) (0.055)
Revenues (− 3) 0.045*** 0.002 0.035
(0.017) (0.013) (0.035)
Expenses(− 3) 0.074*** 0.058*** 0.054**
(0.016) (0.014) (0.021)
Constant 691.67 − 71.398 − 39.678 − 153.464 1270.877 − 1381.556
(561.543) (594.001) (572.274) (527.073) (904.745) (1306.944)
Cantonal FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-Squared 0.988 0.987 0.994 0.995 0.990 0.990
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Table 3 Results for the simultaneous-equations model (Continued)
Overall sample (I) Surpluses only (II) Deficits only (III)
Revenues Expenses Revenues Expenses Revenues Expenses
Joint p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 695 695 451 451 244 244
(1) Dependent variables: true operating revenues and true operating expenses in real terms per capita at time t; (2) cantonal fixed and time fixed effects are
considered; (3) three-stage least square (3SLS) estimator; (4) Parameter values appear without brackets and the standard deviation within. Asterisks denote the
level of significance of parameter values: *** indicating significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level
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ables. Additionally, we excluded the canton of Uri (UR) from
the data set since UR shows particularly high amounts of
additional depreciation charges. Similarly, we excluded the
cantons of Basel-Stadt (BS), Neuchâtel (NE) and St. Gallen
(SG) since their government did not resorted to AD over
the considered period. We re-estimated the various models
without the concerned cantons. Whatever the robustness
check, the sign of the coefficient and the significance of the
explanatory variables and especially of our variable of inter-
est (AD) remain stable.24
Conclusions
This paper considers the extent to which creative account-
ing operations affect the fiscal performance. Governments
and especially finance ministers are able to somehow man-
age reports. What comes immediately to mind in a general
sense are the creative accounting operations used to hide
deficits. This is certainly true in most instances. However,
certain operations may also be used to disguise surpluses
and to present a government’s financial performance as be-
ing more worrisome than it actually is. Compared to the
spending minister or to members of parliament, the finance
minister has a specific expertise in financial issues that
makes it quite easy for him to resort to such practices. And
as opposed to spending ministers, his personal agenda is to
avoid (or lower) public deficits and indebtedness by putting
operating expenses under pressure and by pressing for
higher taxes than otherwise wanted.
We used panel data about the 26 Swiss cantons over the
period 1980–2013. This setting is interesting since the indi-
vidual cantonal legislation sets out or tolerates depreciations
management operations especially designed to inflate expen-
ses—with the so-called additional depreciation charges—and
thus to worsen the financial performance in a way to specif-
ically manage surpluses. Two different models of fiscal per-
formance were estimated. The first model relies on a single
equation with the balance (deficit or surplus) as the
dependent variable. In the second model, the impact on the
balance is indirectly considered since a set of two simultan-
eous equations is used: one with the operating revenues as
the dependent variable and the other with operating ex-
penses as the dependent variable. This simultaneous strategy
allowed us to disentangle the respective effect of deprecia-
tions management on revenues and expenses and thereforeprovide more precise estimations compared to the single-
equation model. The econometric results are based on sev-
eral estimators and proved to be robust. They confirm that a
positive and significant correlation exists between previous
additional depreciation charges and the subsequent level of
revenues, whereas a negative correlation exists with the level
of subsequent expenses, with a similar order of magnitude.
Consequently, depreciations management seems to produce
a significant positive impact on the future balance.
From a policy viewpoint, these findings should be set
in relation to the ongoing international tendency to-
wards implementing more stringent accounting stan-
dards in order to foster governmental transparency.
Obviously, governments must be prevented from cook-
ing their books to disguise an unsustainable financial
situation. However, in countries like Switzerland where
budgetary policy follows a rather conservative stance,
the possibility given to the government to use political
finessing to somehow manage the fiscal performance al-
lows it to sustain this stance and to fulfil the require-
ment of the fiscal rules when they exist. Depreciations
management fosters a kind of elbow room to ensure
structural surpluses or to prevent structural deficits. If
accounting standards would rule it out, the structural
surplus would be reported en pleine lumière, generating
claims for tax cuts or spending increases which eventu-
ally threaten fiscal sustainability. Ultimately, a trade-off
exists between the conflicting wishes for fiscal soundness
and true and fair financial reporting in the public sector.
From a research viewpoint, this article develops the pol-
itical economy of fiscal deficits to take into account the
asymmetry of expertise that exists between the various
stakeholders in budgeting and accounting. Until now, a lot
of attention has been paid to institutional rules and how
effective they are in containing fiscal illusions and the
resulting spending biases. This paper indicates that it is
worthwhile to continue investigating how the technical-
ities of the budget process, from the planning stage to the
reporting stage, make it possible to resolve the uncertainty
related to this process and related political conflicts.
Endnotes
1The IPSAS apply to every public entity (central govern-
ment, subnational level of government and municipality).
IPSAS terminology is used in the text. When necessary,
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cantons are given in footnotes.
2Finance ministers have personal interests in a sound fi-
nancial position. They are thus struggling for that. Indeed,
their prestige and personal benefits (i.e. re-election per-
spectives) mainly depend on their ability to achieve that
goal (Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999). Dafflon and Rossi
(1999) read pointedly that “for a politician seeking re-
election, the probability of staying in office may heavily
depend on his or her budgetary responsibility”.
3See for instance the result of the 2.12.2001 referen-
dum on the implementation of a more stringent budget
rule at the central level (debt brake; Schuldenbremse;
Frein aux dépenses). The proposal was agreed upon in
all cantons, with Geneva being the canton where the ap-
proval rate was the lowest, but still 74.8% of the voters.
4Finanzhaushaltgesetz, Loi sur les finances.
5Jahresrechnungsbericht, Rapport sur les comptes annuels.
6Quizzically enough, the FMA, and all subsequent amend-
ments to it, is drafted by the cantonal finance minister.
7In addition, a number of Acts of Parliament explicitly re-
quire or justify matching revenues (or expenses) for provid-
ing specific public services (or collecting specific revenues).
8Statement of financial performance (also income state-
ment); Erfolgsrechnung; Compte de résultats. According to
Bergmann (2012), the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), a lead-
ing Swiss political and business newspaper, almost exclu-
sively mentions information on the statement of financial
performance when reporting about the financial situation
of local governments.
9Depreciation charges; Abschreibungen; Amortissements.
To simplify this demonstration, we consider depreciation
as the only expense that is purely an accounting charge.
Also to simplify, no revenue is purely an accounting rev-
enue. Actually, some other charges do not correspond to
disbursement and some revenue do not correspond to re-
ceipts, e.g., accrued and deferred liabilities or assets.
10Additional depreciation charges; zusätzliche Abschrei-
bungen; Amortissements supplémentaires. AD’s specific
budget heading in the detailed general purpose financial re-
port is 332 until year 2008 and 383 since then. Other possi-
bilities for political finessing provided by many FMAs
include cookie-jar reserves, reporting capital expenditures as
current ones (and vice-versa), false provisions, prefinancing.
11True depreciation charges (Abschreibung des Verwal-
tungsvermögens; Amortissements du patrimoine adminis-
tratif) are recognised, according to the chart of accounts,
under a specific budget heading (331 until year 2008 and
33 since then).
12Reported balances have also been cleaned of opera-
tions on cookie-jar reserves (Spezialfinanzierungen;
Financements spéciaux) and truly exceptional operating
revenues and operating expenses. The time span of the
data set is conditioned by the adoption of the commonchart of accounts by the cantons. The chart of account
was adopted by some cantons in 1980 already.
13The implicit Swiss GDP deflator is used as deflator
(2012 = 100). Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office.
14See Soguel and Ecabert (2015) for more information
pertaining additional budget appropriation, spending
drift and rebudgeting.
15The political ideology scale we use to compute lean-
ing was developed by Ladner (2006). The higher the
value, the more the government’s political centre of
gravity leans to the right.
16Summary statistics for the controls are presented in
Appendix (Table 4). The table also indicates the origin
of data used.
17Results for all the tests are presented in Appendix:
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test (Table 7); Wooldridge
test for autocorrelation of order one (Table 8); Arellano-
Bond test for autocorrelation of order one and two
(Table 9); Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test
for random effects (Table 10); Hausman test for random
versus fixed effects (Table 11); and Variance Inflation Fac-
tor (VIF) (Table 12).
18In addition to including two-way fixed effects in the
model, operating revenue and operating expenses have
been cleaned of exceptional components (e.g. money re-
ceived extraordinarily from the Swiss National Bank in
2005).
19See Tables 5 and 6 in Appendix. Instruments proposed
in this subsection are used when performing 2SLS and
3SLS (when estimating the simultaneous-equation model).
20R and E are also both adjusted for creative account-
ing operations and exceptional operating revenues and
exceptional operating expenses, respectively.
21We also estimated the model without including time
fixed effects. With that specification, in model I, GROWTH
becomes positively correlated with the cantonal balance
at a 10% level of significance; UNEMPLOYMENT correlates
significantly (5%) and—as expected—negatively; and
ELDERLY turns out to be insignificant.
22Here again, we estimated the model without includ-
ing time fixed effects. With that specification, in model
I, UNEMPLOYMENT, ELDERLY, INITIATIVE, and REFERENDUM
correlate significantly (1 or 5%).
23According to the mechanics of the cantons’
medium-term financial planning, t − 3 is of special inter-
est because that very year is the one that each year newly
enters the planning period. Thus, a lag length of 3 years
corresponds to reasonable beliefs about the period over
which expenses could help predict revenues (and vice-
versa).
24The robustness checks represent a large number
of regressions. Due to space constraints, the results
are not reported in the article. However, they are
available upon request.
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Variables Domain Unit Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Balancea R CHF/inhabitants 129.914 514.013 − 3151.512 2370.750
Revenuesa R+ CHF/inhabitants 8435.790 3351.761 4039.267 27755.070
Expensesa R+ CHF/inhabitants 8305.876 3333.784 3760.656 26766.070
ADa R+ CHF/inhabitants 105.683 250.608 0.000 2819.444
Growthb R Percentage 1.708 2.450 − 7.504 9.635
Unemploymentc R+ Percentage 2.148 1.723 0.000 7.800
Elderlyd R+ Percentage 15.020 2.174 10.142 21.756
Leaninge [0–10] Index 5.550 0.514 4.220 7.057
Fragmentatione,f R+ Count 3.437 0.935 1.000 5.000
Concordancee R+ Percentage 78.300 22.900 0.000 100.000
Departmentsf R+ Count 7.145 2.174 4.000 13.000
Electione 0 or 1 Dummy 0.276 0.447 0.000 1.000
Initiatived,e,f,g [0–6] Index 4.497 1.138 2.333 6.000
Referendumd,e,f,g [0–6] Index 3.931 1.181 1.000 6.000
Rulesh [0–3] Index 0.529 0.954 0.000 3.000
Misestimationa R CHF/inhabitants − 86.072 230.030 − 2145.395 1227.752
N = 729
aAnnual financial reports of the 26 cantons, compilation by the authors
bBAK Basel
cState Secretariat for Economic Affairs
dSwiss Federal Statistical Office
eAnnée politique suisse
fBADAC-Database on Swiss cantons and cities
gFinanzdirektorenkonferenz
hLuechinger and Schaltegger (2013)
Table 5 Covariance between the potentially endogenous
covariates and the instruments
Variables Misestimation Referendum Initiative Rules
Instrument Misestimation
(D1)
Referendum
(− 2)
Initiative
(− 2)
Rules
(− 2)
Covariance 0.526 0.907 0.954 0.872
(− 2) denotes the second lag value of the variable whereas (D1)
refers to the first difference of the variable
Table 6 Validity of the instruments (2SLS First stage F-stat)
Variables Misestimation Referendum Initiative Rules
Instrument Misestimation
(D1)
Referendum
(− 2)
Initiative
(− 2)
Rules
(− 2)
F-stat 215.41 13.49 22.82 458.47
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(− 2) denotes the second lag value of the variable whereas (D1) refers to the
first difference of the variable. F-stat higher than 16.85 reveals a
valid instrument
Table 7 Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for
heteroskedasticity
Chi2 p value
Balance 110.380 0.000
Revenues 375.300 0.000
Expenses 1293.180 0.000
H0: No heteroskedasticity
Table 8 Wooldridge test for autocorrelation of order one
F-stat p value
Balance 21.548 0.001
Revenues 36.274 0.000
Expenses 11.735 0.002
H0: No autocorrelation of order one
Table 9 Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of order one and
two
AR(1) AR(2)
z-stat p value z-stat p value
Balance − 1.730 0.083 0.490 0.626
Revenues 0.530 0.594 1.120 0.263
Expenses 0.140 0.890 0.350 0.728
AR(1) refers to autocorrelation of order one whereas AR(2) denotes
autocorrelation of order two. H0: No autocorrelation
Table 10 Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for
random effects
Chi2 p value
Balance 0.390 0.533
Revenues 12.410 0.000
Expenses 4.660 0.031
H0: RE not necessarily appropriate
Table 11 Hausman test for random versus fixed effects
Chi2 p value
Balance 17.050 0.148
Revenues 28.350 0.005
Expenses 53.780 0.000
H0: Difference in coefficients not systematic
Table 12 Variance inflation factor (VIF) for the regressors
Variables Without FE Cantonal FE Cantonal and Time FE
AD(− 1) 1.16 1.39 1.62
Balance(− 1) 1.29 1.42 1.75
Misestimation 1.11 1.26 1.44
Growth 1.07 1.12 2.26
Unemployment 1.62 2.17 9.66
Elderly 1.25 5.37 8.27
Leaning 1.29 2.81 2.99
Fragmentation 1.65 5.85 6.32
Concordance 1.70 7.36 7.53
Departments 1.31 3.11 3.76
Election 1.08 1.14 1.18
Initiative 1.88 35.06 38.01
Referendum 1.85 8.09 8.72
Rules 1.10 3.88 4.82
Mean VIF 1.38 4.93 5.14
Multicollinearity may be an issue when the VIF is equal or higher than 10
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